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Abstract
In the last decade, energy policies across EUmember states have shifted, with fears emerging over the feasibility of the decarbonisation
targets set up at European level. In many cases, the changes have been triggered by weakened economic conditions linked to the last
international economic crisis (2008), but in some others, they respond to national political preferences that have been given priority over
long-term goals related to sustainability. The second half of 2016was particularly full of events that on one hand, introduced uncertainty
over markets, and on the other hand, may condition the progress (bothweakening it and leaning it towards the wrong path) towards the
Energy Union, the latest attempt to achieve energy market integration by the EU institutions. This paper will focus on three events to
analyse their influence over EU’s energy governance patterns: The first is the Brexit vote and the implications over budget availability
for emissions reduction projects. The second is the election of Donald Trump as president of the USA, with his declared disbelief in
climate change. Finally yet importantly is the latest decision by OPEC to cut production in order to increase oil prices. With the
exception of Brexit, these events are external to the EU, but all of themwill have an impact over EU energy policy decisions. Bearing in
mind that goals set up for 2030 are already ‘softer’ than expected compared to the 2020 ones, the question is whether those events could
push policymakers more towards European targets concerned with security of supply, conflicting with emissions reduction goals.
Keywords Energy governance . Energy policy . EnergyUnion . Integration . Sustainability
Introduction
The European Union (EU) launched its Energy Union Package
(European Commission [EC] 2015a) in 2015, a Framework
Strategy ‘with a forward-looking climate change policy’. The
language suggests that priority has been given within energy
policy to tackling climate change-related issues. The strategy is
built around five priority areas (decarbonisation, energy effi-
ciency, internal energy markets, energy security, and research,
innovation, and competitiveness) which are supposed to be
integrated (European Commission 2015a).
Governance of the Energy Union needs to be based on
several elements: integrated national climate and energy plans,
planning and reporting obligations of the member states, a
transparent monitoring system, and regional cooperation
(European Commission 2015b). Among other aims, gover-
nance should ensure that the EU-level targets for renewables
(binding, i.e. compulsory for member states) and energy effi-
ciency (indicative, non-binding) are delivered. It should also
be anchored in EU legislation, existing and new, which should
involve full participation of the European Parliament
(European Commission 2015b). The difficulties of achieving
this desired governance framework are acknowledged by the
proposal to regulate it [‘certain redundancy, incoherence and
overlaps and lacking integration between energy and climate
areas’…‘not suited to support the achievement of the 2030
Framework for Energy and Climate, nor synchronised with
the planning and reporting obligations under the Paris
Agreement’] (European Commission 2016a). This proposal
intends to promote better coordination between the EU and
national actors as well as to reduce administrative burdens.
Within the Energy Union Framework Strategy, the element
most closely related to climate change is the ‘decarbonisation’
priority. However, the primary means of meeting its objec-
tives—reduction of emissions using the Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS), increased energy efficiency, be the number
one in renewables—may be vulnerable to weaknesses in im-
plementation strategy as well as to tensions with the goals of
energy security articulated elsewhere in the same Framework
Strategy. Specifically, energy efficiency is intended to be the
foremost renewable energy transition strategy, but progress on
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implementation has been limited by the poor functioning of
the marketplace supporting the ETS, due in part to the non-
binding nature of its targets (Nichols 2014). Inability to meet
energy efficiency goals thus hampers the ability of renewable
targets to offset reliance on fossil fuels as a source of energy
security, ensured by the Directive on minimum reserves of
crude oil or petroleum products (Official Journal of the
European Union [OJEU] 2009).
The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the EU’s
energy policy is consistent and forward-looking or if there are
internal contradictions that could hinder the achievement of
successful and coherent outcomes that are in line with the pub-
licly expressed commitments towards the decarbonisation of
the European economies. Examples of these public expressions
are the ‘Roadmap to a low carbon economy’ approved in 2011
(EC 2011) or, more recently, the speech of Commissioner Arias
Cañete at the Business Europe PowerMarket encounter in 2016
(EC 2016b). Recent events (2016) namely Brexit, the change
on climate policy brought by the election of Donald Trump as
president in the USA, and the agreement of the Organisation of
Petroleum Exporter Countries (OPEC) to reduce production to
keep oil prices high, may compound any internal stresses within
the EU energy policy framework, potentially shaping its direc-
tion going forward. The research questions to be answered then
become: Is the EU energy policy consistent and forward-
looking? Can the Energy Union really fulfil its aims? What
impact may 2016 events have on EU energy governance?
The framework overlooking the analysis builds around the
concept of governance (see for instance Kolher-Koch and
Rittberger 2006) and the different actors participating in EU
energy policy governance. Discourse analysis has been used
for the study, with sources including official documentation
from the European institutions, reports from interest groups
and energy experts, and the views publicly expressed by dif-
ferent actors, reflected mainly in interview transcripts
appearing in press articles, press releases, and public speeches.
Terms particularly looked at in line with the Energy Union
stated aims include ‘decarbonisation’, ‘low carbon’, ‘gover-
nance’, and ‘climate change’. The analysis shows that among
the three events under scrutiny, Brexit is the one with the
highest likely influence over EU energy policy governance;
insofar, it will change the actors participating in the process
and the composition of the institutions. The following section
will summarise the current political environment in the EU
and member states and its link with energy policy develop-
ments. It will be followed by three sections covering each of
the three identified events, finishing with concluding remarks.
Situation at EU level and in member states
Recent years have witnessed a convulsed environment across
the EU for a variety of reasons. The recovery from the 2008
economic crisis has left countries rebelling against austerity
measures that had disturbing social costs (Oxfam 2013;
Caritas Europa 2014; ESAD 2015). The refugee crisis, caused
by the war in Syria and other instability movements in the
Middle East, revealed lack of solidarity in some countries
(Chappel 2016; Sherer 2017). Indiscriminate jihadist terrorist
attacks took place in cities across several member states
(Hanrahan andWang 2017). Worrying signals of undemocrat-
ic behaviour appeared in some member states [Hungary’s new
constitution in 2013 (Verseck 2013); attempts in Poland to
undermine the constitutional court or to approve regressive
anti-abortion laws (Bilefsky 2016; Lyman and Berendt
2016)]. Scepticism about the unity of the EU and the pursuit
of further integration has existed in various degrees for some
time, more visibly since the rejection of the EUConstitution in
2005 by France and the Netherlands (Lubbers and Scheepers
2010). However, aforementioned circumstances have height-
ened this Euroscepticism, resulting in unsettled political re-
gimes (France, Netherlands, Austria) and particularly in the
United Kingdom (UK) in the vote to leave the EU taken on
June 2016. Issues cited above led to demonstrations pro and
against migration and refugees, and anti-austerity in several
cities across EU member states. Politicians needed to react to
these citizenship voices, and the results of electoral processes
taking place in 2017 may have been influenced by what ap-
pears to be a new focus on national issues, instead of wider
transnational integration. This interaction or protest reaction
can be seen as an increasing participation of civil society in
EU governance (Finke 2007) with differentiated results across
countries. In France, Macron, successful presidential candi-
date, advocated transition to renewable energy, defended the
implementation of a carbon tax and positioned himself against
the moves of Trump’s administration, but in general, issues
around climate change were not the main priority in electoral
discourses (Timperley 2017a). In Germany, the tone of the
discourses in the electoral process of 2017 turned clearly to
national concerns, even when talking about climate-related
topics. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Angela
Merkel’s party, did not mention the European ETS in its man-
ifesto, whilst stating that climate protection ‘must not lead to
jobs moving to countries with lower standards’ (Timperley
2017b), reflecting worries over the loss of jobs in coal-
related industries and regions.
In the EU energy policy area, however, the current situation
of a lack of integrated energy policy has its origins decades
ago. Focusing on the aftermath of the economic crisis, what
was observed across different member states, particularly
those worse affected by it, is the reduction or elimination of
any support schemes for renewables—in particular the Feed-
In-Tariffs (FIT). Some countries, particularly Spain, are at risk
of not reaching their targets for 2020 (European Renewable
Energy Council 2013). Table 1 summarises the situation
across EU member states.
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Despite the expressed wish to promote renewables and the
targets set for 2020 or the aim to become in general a low
carbon economy by 2050, the European Commission seems
to have moved from the ‘sustainable, smart, and inclusive
growth’ discourse to one of security of supply and market
competition. The Commission set out the guidelines to move
Table 1 Summary of supporting instruments for renewable energies in the EU
Country FIT program Government subsidies/support instruments FIT start year
Austria Yes Subsidies; subsidy for heating First: 2000; last: 2012
Belgium No Certificates; quota system; subsidies;
loans and taxes depending on region
First: 1999; last: 2002
Bulgaria Yes Grant for heating (loan) and tax exemption First: 2007; last: 2011
Croatia Yes Loans 2012
Cyprus Yes* Subsidy and net metering First: 2017
Czech Republic Suspended from 2014 Premium tariff (green bonus); subsidies First: 2005; last: 2013
Denmark No Premium tariff; net metering; loan guarantees;
subsidies and tax regulation
First: 1998; last: 2012
Estonia No Premium tariff; investment support;
subsidies for heating
First: 2003; last: 2007
Finland No Premium tariff; subsidies;
bonus and investment support for heat
2010
France Yes Premium tariff; tenders; tax benefits;
loans and subsidies for heating
First: 1996; last: 2000
Germany Yes Loans; premium tariff; subsidies
and loans for heating
First: 1991; last: 2017
Greece Suspended 2015 Feed-in premiums; net metering;
subsidies and tax exemptions; loans;
subsidies and tax regulation for heating
First: 1994; last: 2015
Hungary Yes Premium tariff; net metering; subsidies First: 2007; last: 2016
Ireland Suspended end 2015 Tax relief scheme; subsidies and tax regulation
mechanism for heating;
new measures expected 2017
First: 2006; last: 2012
Italy Yes Premium tariffs; net metering; tax regulation
mechanisms; tenders; price base mechanisms; loans
First: 2007; last: 2012
Latvia Yes- but on hold Net metering; tax reductions for heating On hold till 2020
on suspicion of corruption
Lithuania No Feed-in premium; tenders; net-metering; tax relief 2012
Luxembourg Yes Subsidies; tax regulation mechanisms;
Subsidies for heating
First: 1993; last: 2008
Malta Yes Investment grants; subsidies for heating First: 2012; last: 2016
Netherlands No Premium tariff; loans; net metering; tax regulation
mechanisms; same except net metering for heat
2009
Poland Yes Quota system; tenders; loans; subsidies and tax
incentives; subsidies and loans for heat
2014—approved
(first tender December 2016)
Portugal Yes Subsidies for heating cancelled First: 2001; last: 2014
Romania No Quota system (green certificates); subsidies;
subsidies for heating; financial support for new
installations producing renewable electricity
finished at the end of 2016
None
Slovakia Yes Subsidies; tax regulation mechanisms; subsidies for heating First: 2001; last: 2012
Slovenia No Premium tariff; loans and subsidies; loans and subsidies for heating 2002
Spain Suspended 2012 Premium tariff (suspended); price regulation system since 2015 1997
Sweden No Quota system; subsidies and tax regulation mechanisms;
tax exemption for heating
None
United Kingdom Yes Loan; quota; tax regulation mechanisms; loans and
price-based mechanisms for heating
First: 2009; last: 2012
Source: RES-Legal (http://www.res-legal.eu/), last extracted 27.11.2017
Unless otherwise stated, the instruments listed for each country are applicable to electricity
*Transitional FIT system for 1 year, after which companies will pass to the normal market price
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from fixed tariff rates to feed-in premiums from 2016 onwards
(European Commission 2013), considering wind and solar
technologies mature enough to face market competition and
existing subsidies as distortion of the internal market. This
move has been criticised for being driven by the big energy
companies and their lobbying groups (Nielsen 2014). In fact,
latest reports highlight both historical and still existing gov-
ernment support of fossil fuels, particularly coal, in the mem-
ber states (Ecofys 2014), even if said reports also mention the
support given to renewables through different public policy
interventions. Lobbying activities by energy companies are
well known, and evidence seems to indicate that fossil fuel
companies have been more successful in their contact with
authorities and dedicate considerable amounts of money to
ensure their voice is heard ahead of relevant decision-
making processes. Examples can be found at country level,
where for instance Shell had 112 meetings with ministers in
the UK and BP had 79 meetings, between 2010 and 2014,
totalling more than twice the meetings that Green groups
(Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) had with ministers dur-
ing the same period (Evans et al. 2015). At EU level, a report
(Corporate Europe Observatory 2017) indicates that gas com-
panies have been meeting the commissioners in charge of
climate and energy policy 460 times during the last two and
a half years and have spent more than €100 million in lobby-
ing activities to ensure that gas projects are approved
(Chapman 2017). Public interest groups against the expansion
of gas infrastructure spent barely 3% of that amount
(Corporate Europe Observatory 2017). Most fossil fuel com-
panies are multinationals: their activities go beyond the EU
context and there is evidence of their influence in the USA. A
representative group of fossil fuel companies is thought to
spend $115 million per year on obstructive climate policy
lobbying: $27 million by ExxonMobil, $22 million by Shell,
$65 million by the American Petroleum Institute (Exxon and
Shell contribute here too), and $9 million by the Western
States Petroleum Association and the Australian Petroleum
Production & Exploration Association (InfluenceMap 2016).
Something similar seems to have happened with the energy
efficiency (and renewables) targets for 2030. After multiple
rounds of negotiations and conflicting positions, the potential
gains that could come from the promotion of energy efficiency
were outweighed by the fears of a negative impact on the
European ETS. Increased energy efficiency would mean re-
duction of emissions, which would translate into lower needs
to acquire emission permits, making their price go down and
subsequently making the purpose of the market redundant.
Even if some groups considered the initial call of the
Commission for a 30% target insufficient, the Council opted
by a smaller goal of 27%, to be reviewed in 2020 (European
Commission 2015c). This is an indicative and not a binding
target, which leaves member states without individual targets.
It thus weakens the possible outcomes of any measure. Some
authors consider the election of binding or indicative targets
irrelevant and depending on government priorities (cost-
containment or effectiveness in deployment) (Mir-Artigues
and Del Rio 2016). However, the indicative nature of the
targets involves no sanctions if they are not reached, and en-
forcement options would be softer (Lafferty and Ruud 2008).
On these grounds, the approach taken has been criticised
openly by green industry and climate groups (Nichols 2014).
The decision was made under the pressure of the increasing
tensions between Russia and Ukraine, which is significant as
there were fears of disruptions in energy supply, as it had
previously happened. A united position was sought even if
was not as ambitious as it would be desirable. There was a
view of possible modifications occurring after the Paris
Summit in 2015 (Jacobsen and Crisp 2014) in order to make
the targets more ambitious, but in the aftermath of the Summit,
no mention was made of such possibility.
Controversial discourse continues with what can be classi-
fied as an anti-environmental decision in 2016, when the
Commission approved a continuation of coal subsidies for
another 8 years. This was celebrated by the fossil fuel lobby
and gives room for the UK to provide even higher subsidies to
fossil fuel companies after Brexit (Hope 2016). But this is in
line with the national concerns of other member states over the
potential job losses in the coal sector, namely Germany and
Poland.
If the concept of governance is understood as the interac-
tion of public and private actors to engage in policy formula-
tion (Heritier 2002), the examples abovementioned (with re-
gard to lobbying) could be used to argue that, with regard to
energy policy, fossil fuel companies may have had advantage
to get their points of view upheld in front of the European
institutions. This poses questions about the legitimacy of the
governance framework, if the provision of information is
asymmetrical and only elites have access to the institutions
(Hauser 2011). It also indicates that national priorities are
influencing the decision-making process at EU level.
Effects of Brexit
The main concern with regard to Brexit has to do with the
resources available for sustainability projects, given that the
UK has been providing a substantial amount of the EU budget,
but also given that EU resources have funded many environ-
mental projects in the UK (House of Commons 2017). In the
energy area, investments on infrastructures could be compro-
mised, and it remains to be seen how the interconnections be-
tween countries will progress in order to avoid energy ‘islands’.
The UK is a net contributor to the EU budget. Its contribu-
tion was 18,209.4 €million in 2015. This accounts for 15.4%
of the total revenue, making the UK the third largest contrib-
utor after Germany and France (European Commission
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2015d). As part of the Brexit negotiations, it is expected that
the UK will pay some sort of divorce bill ‘to honour its share
of the financing of all the obligations undertaken while it was
a member of the Union’ (European Commission 2017a).
However, it is clear that, for the next Multiannual Financial
Framework, changes would need to be made, as otherwise
there will be a gap in the finances. There are several options
for these adjustments (Chomicz 2017): (1) Adjust the budget
size counting on which programmes the UK may continue to
be part of and paying to. (2) Maintain the payments to the
budget of the remaining 27 member states that have been
contributing to the UK rebate (payment that the UK was re-
ceiving back and will not continue). (3) Make budget cuts in
all areas. (4) Decrease the funding for areas considered of
lower priority.
There will need to be re-calculations to allocate the access
to funding from the Cohesion Fund—aimed at member states
whose Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is less than
90% the EU average, in order to reduce economic and social
disparities and promote sustainable development (Official
Journal of the European Union 2006) or the Structural
Funds, for instance. This is because the UK is one of the
members with highest GDP/GNI levels, so once the UK
leaves, the EU average GDP will decrease, and consequently,
the distance of the poorest countries with the new EU average
will decrease too (they will be closer to the 90% threshold).
This fact, added to the uncertainty of the negotiation results,
makes the first option, adjusting the budget in line with the
new pool of contributions, extremely complex, even though it
would be more accurate and the size of the adjustment smaller.
The second option is quite controversial, possibly facing re-
sistance from those member states that currently contribute the
most to the rebate (France, Spain, and Italy—EC 2015d).
Making budget cuts in all areas in a proportional way may
seem fair and relatively simple, but it bears the risk of leaving
sensitive areas without enough funding. This takes us to the
fourth option of assigning levels of priority to different policy
areas and cutting the funding of those with the lowest priority.
Again, though feasible, this too can be controversial: It poses
questions about who is going to decide, and how the levels of
priority will be defined. If environment and sustainability are
negatively affected, which may be a possibility given the low-
ering of the profile that issues such as climate change are
taking in the political arena (Simms 2017), this can impact
the funding for energy projects that try to address climate
change and sustainability-related problems. Europe could
end up with a watered down Energy Union Strategy.
Brexit will reduce the number of EU Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) and will affect the distribution
of votes. It will also affect the Commission composition, and
there will be one fewer country making decisions. One party
less in a negotiation theoretically should lead to decisions
being made more quickly, but what if the parties left at the
discussion table have more polarised positions? The UK is
considered a big country within the EU. Without the UK, a
country like Poland could take a more prominent role, and
Poland is not likely to champion ‘green’ issues in the way
the UK has historically done (Martewicz 2017).
Some had already warned before the referendum (Rayner
2016) that Brexit could put the EU efforts to reduce carbon
emissions at risk. After the referendum, this was given more
detail, insofar as the European ETS funding would suffer
without the UK. Reduced funding will compromise the mon-
ey that Eastern European countries have been receiving from
the ETS auction schemes to adapt their energy systems (Khan
2017), so their transformation to less polluting energy supplies
could be at risk.
With regard to energy interconnections between member
states, Brexit could have significant impacts. The remaining
EU members will focus on building stronger interconnections
between them, with doubts over political support from those
remaining members to have greater interconnections with the
UK. Since the UK depends on energy imports, it will be in its
interest to take part on interconnection projects, but for the
remainingmembers, their priority would be those countries that
are still part of the EU. However, Ireland would be at the end of
pipes that have to cross the UK. So there are questions about
how Ireland can guarantee energy security of supply after
Brexit, whilst depending on energy flowing through the UK
market (Simon Virley, from KPMG in Crisp 2017). It is possi-
ble that energy interconnections between Ireland, the UK, and
the rest of the EU will be part of the negotiations of the future
relationship of the UKwith the EU. Given the fact that the issue
of the border with Northern Ireland is already proving contro-
versial, there is uncertainty about what the future may bring for
energy security of supply, particularly for Ireland.
On a positive note, there are also arguments saying that the
EU will improve its renewable energy outlook without the UK,
since the country is far behind its targets for 2020 whilst other
member states are making significant progress (Lycetts 2017).
All in all, Brexit is causing uncertainty, so it is difficult to
assess to which extent there will be a positive or negative
impact from the energy governance perspective. However,
given the slow progress observed on the Energy Union
roadmap (EC 2017b), with status reports based on data mostly
related to 2015 (EC 2017c), it seems that 2016 was almost a
lost year with regard to the necessary steps to achieve the
desired targets.
The new approach of the US government
In a globalised world, what happens in one country can have
impacts elsewhere. Given the traditional energy dependency
of manyWestern countries, this is particularly true concerning
issues related to climate change and energy.
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Before the last US election (November 2016), some already
warned of the possible consequences for climate and energy
policies of a Trump win. The view was that his victory would
lead to substantial changes/upending of climate change poli-
cies, as his position is radically opposed to the policies adopted
by the Obama administration (Crisp 2016). It could soon be
observed that the fears were not unfounded, when in March
2017, he took the first steps to dismantle Obama’s Clean Power
Plan, gaining criticism in and out of the USA, including from
the EU institutions (Commissioner Arias Cañete) (Smith et al.
2017). A few months later, he decided to withdraw the USA
from the Paris Agreement (Selin 2017) creating a generalised
distrust in the USAwith regard to multilateral cooperation.
The EU has been firm in its criticism of the new US posi-
tion, but what can this actually mean in practical terms? There
have been radical calls within Europe to isolate the USA and
stop any re-initiation of transatlantic trade talks (Martin
Schulz, candidate in the German elections), the rationale being
that as the USA is not assuming the costs of fighting against
climate change, it would create competitive distortion, so no
additional market access should be granted (Livingston and
Brattberg 2017). The chairman of ArcelorMittal (from India)
called for Europe to stablish a ‘carbon border tax’ (Livingston
and Brattberg 2017), which would allow European companies
to keep their competitiveness against third countries andmain-
tain the innovations to continue reducing emissions.
It has become apparent that the USA is losing the leader-
ship role in the fight against climate change that it had taken
from Europe after the failure of Copenhagen in 2009. On one
hand, it has made visible the commitment of both China and
the EU to work together, and strengthen their relationship
(Selin 2017). On the other hand, it seems that this time
China is taking the leadership role, amid fears in American
forums that the consequence of the exit from Paris will ‘make
China great again’ (Carrington 2017).
Areas in which the USA and the EU can work together even
in this environment have to do mainly with energy security, as
it is in the US interest that Europe reduce its energy dependence
from Russia. However, this is also problematic, as the USA has
publicly opposed the Nord Stream 2 project (Livingston and
Brattberg 2017). Regarding attempts for cleaner energy, there
can be possibilities of cooperation on nuclear and, given the
preference for coal of president Trump, on carbon capture and
storage. The latter is less likely though, since the EU is still
committed to getting away from coal, despite the maintenance
of coal subsidies previously mentioned, and the investments in
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) have not been completely
successful (Livingston and Brattberg 2017).
The main driver pro-renewable energies in the USA are
state-led policies rather than federal ones, so in the short term,
there should not be too many changes (Landis-Marinello
2017; Fitfield 2017). States have authority over the siting of
energy projects, they have the ability to create renewable
portfolio standards and have been doing so, and there have
been multistate efforts to promote renewable energy and ad-
dress the impacts of climate change. It appears clear that the
focus of a majority of states is on continuing with the benefits
that the promotion of renewables has been providing, even if
there is no support from the central administration. In the long
term, however, the removal of the Clean Power Plan can make
things change (Divva Reddy, from Eurasia Group in Crisp
2016) as it would take out of the picture a long-term vision
for a low-carbon economy in the USA. This could be an op-
portunity for Europe to regain the leadership in renewables,
which the Energy Union is calling for. The UK, however, will
not be part of that leadership, unless it specifically agrees to
support the EU’s joint efforts as part of a Brexit deal. This
could have been a possibility in the past, but it is doubtful in
the current environment, given that the manifesto of the
Conservatives in the last election (Conservatives 2017) did
not mention renewables and specifically supported shale gas.
With regard to encouraging other countries to withdraw
from Paris or not make the effort, Trump’s decision may have
an indirect impact, but so far, the support tomove into a lower-
carbon energy system is strong and expected to continue
(Simon Virley, from KPMG in Crisp 2016).
Since European energy imports from the USA are limited,
the behaviour of the USA may not have a big impact on the
diversification of energy imports as part of the Energy Union
plan. Therefore, even if Trump plans to stop shale gas exports
in the future, the focus of the EU would still be to build bigger
interconnection between member states. The UK can be af-
fected more strongly (Simon Virley in Crisp 2016) since its
fossil fuel reserves are in decline and are supportive of shale
gas. So in theory, it could be interested in receiving imports.
Thus, it could try to reach individually an agreement with the
USA on this area, once Brexit becomes a reality.
The election of Trump may not have a big impact on EU’s
energy governance, at least directly, but it can have an influence
on trade negotiations and energy security approaches, aside
from the opportunity for the EU to take the leadership role on
climate change matters. However, given the fact that in the
future the action from the biggest emitters will be fundamental,
it is more likely that the world will look at how China behaves.
This can have ramifications in other diplomatic areas. There is a
risk for EU’s energy governance, if Eastern European countries
such as Poland, heavily dependent on coal, cultivate ties with
Trump’s administration in order to break the path towards
decarbonisation that the EU has set and which they consider
as ‘utopian’ (Livingston and Brattberg 2017).
The OPEC decisions
In November 2016, OPEC reached an agreement to cut oil
production for the first time in 8 years, also including non-
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OPEC countries in the deal (Razzouk et al. 2016). The deci-
sion was seen with scepticism given the traditional incentives
that individual countries have had in the past to breach the
agreements. At this time, things look a bit different and the
agreement has been kept and in fact extended until 2018, after
a decision from Saudi Arabia and Russia in May 2017 (Reed
2017). In a way, the two decisions had some impact, namely
temporary increases in the price of oil to $56.64 per barrel
(Fletcher 2016). However, prices went down again to around
$53 per barrel (Reed 2017).
OPEC had recognised that part of its problems to keep
prices up and thus stable profits was related to excess of sup-
ply (OPEC 2016), so the decision in November 2016 was
trying to balance inventories (Razzouk et al. 2016). Low
prices of oil had been acting as a disincentive for investments,
so there were fears that, in the medium term, lack of invest-
ments would result in lack of supply and excessive prices as
observed in previous oil crises (OPEC 2016). This may tem-
porarily benefit oil producer countries, but the issues that
would originate elsewhere would lead importer countries to-
wards alternative sources of energy, which would ultimately
go against the producers’ long-term aims.
The problem now comes from the fact that prices are barely
going over the threshold supposed to be enough to boost in-
vestments. This poses questions over OPEC’s continued ability
to be a game changer in the energy market. There are three
main reasons for the current situation (Reed 2017): Firstly,
predictions over oil reserves that push prices up are made as-
suming constant increases in demand, but currently demand is
either not growing or not doing it as quickly as desirable (IEA
2018). Secondly, linked to the decrease in demand, is the surge
of electric vehicles. Technologies are progressing quickly and
countries clearly favour investment in related innovations, fur-
ther decreasing demand for oil (Prince 2017). Thirdly, the role
of shale gas, particularly in the US, needs to be mentioned. An
increase in the price of oil makes shale extraction more profit-
able, which increases supply in that area. Shale extraction is
more expensive than conventional techniques, but now, com-
panies are finding the right financing instruments available so
funding is not a problem (Reed 2017).
Could this scenario prompt any reaction from EU energy
policymakers? The likely answer is no. The EU and OPEC
have been keeping regular meetings under the framework of
the so called Energy Dialogue, the latest of which took place
also in 2016 (OPEC 2016). Both parties share information
about their current situation, common concerns, and forecast
for the coming years, but the reality of activities is reduced to
joint studies and completion of reports (OPEC 2016). A new
meeting should have taken place on the first half of 2017 but
has not yet happened at the time of writing. Governance of
energy policy in the EU is unlikely to be affected by OPEC
decisions, since EU policymakers already advocate for strate-
gies that diversify energy sources and suppliers. Internal
problems of OPEC countries are not an EU priority, notwith-
standing that lack of stability in those countries could trigger
problems whose effects can expand worldwide.
Issues that oil producer countries are facing shaped the
recent agreement reached at the OPEC meeting in Vienna
(November 2017), to extend once more the cut on production
until the end of 2018, and again including non-OPEC coun-
tries in the deal. The price of Brent (used as benchmark price
mostly in Europe) went up to $63.37 per barrel, but the West
Texas Intermediate (used as benchmark price by the USA)
went down to $57 a barrel (Wearden and Fletcher 2017).
This is a testament to the difficulties and volatility affecting
oil prices and to the lower influence that these agreements
have in attempts to keep oil prices high.
Even if this purpose (high prices) were fulfilled, since the
EU is committed to decarbonisation, an increase in the price of
oil could only prompt further commitment in that direction to
reduce oil dependency. From the governance framework point
of view, it could be expected that a big player in the energy
market like the OPEC could have an influence on energy
policymaking in the EU, but evidence seems to indicate that
this is not the case and that other actors, as previously dem-
onstrated, play a more relevant role.
Concluding remarks
Of the three events analysed by this paper, it becomes apparent
that Brexit is the one with the highest likelihood to affect
energy policy governance in the European Union. Whilst the
outcome for both UK and EU will depend on the result of the
negotiations, it is foreseeable that the overall impact will be
negative, understood as one that takes the EU away from its
commitment towards a low-carbon economy. The two main
reasons for such a negative outcome are, on one side, the
decrease in the level of priority assigned to environmental
and climate change concerns, as shown by the disappearance
of the topic from political discourses. On the other side, we
find the possible pre-eminence of countries less favourable
towards greener energy policy in the governance framework
once the UK leaves the EU.
Trump’s approach to energy policy however could be pos-
itive; insofar, it could bring the EU back to a leadership role in
the fight against climate change, if China does not take the
lead first, as some are pointing. However, a joint leadership of
EU and China could also prevail. Increases in the price of oil
could only contribute positively to enhance the EU’s commit-
ment to decarbonisation, so in that regard, actions from OPEC
would have little impact.
The reduced progress observed so far in the roadmap to the
Energy Union can be attributed to the environment of uncertain-
ty created by Brexit and other internal affairs, as well as the
uncertainty over Trump’s approach towards Europe. So it is still
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early to answer the question about the possibility of the Energy
Union to fulfil its aims. However, with regard to the question
about EU’s energy policy being consistent and forward-looking,
it is difficult to give a positive answer. The issues highlighted by
this paper, particularly the ones related to Brexit and to a lesser
extent the possible influence of US energy policy under Trump,
dividing member states’ views on coal, pose doubts about the
direction of EU energy policy in years to come.
It is not possible to measure if the negative aspects, coming
from internal events such as Brexit, will be overcome by positive
aspects coming from external events (Trump’s policies and
OPEC agreements), but it seems unlikely now. What appears
clear is that the governance framework for energy policy in the
EU is going to change, and its shape and directionwill depend on
which actors and from which remaining member states take the
lead. Since the political arena is changing more than ever within
and out of the EU, the overall picture is one of uncertainty.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank the University of Chester for
the funding provided to attend the 47th UACES conference in Krakow,
where valuable feedback for this paper was received.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons At t r ibut ion 4 .0 In te rna t ional License (h t tp : / /
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Bilefsky, D. (2016) EU chides Poland for failing to uphold rule of law.
The New York Times. 01.06.2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
06/02/world/europe/poland-democracy-eu.html. Accessed 31
August 2017
Caritas Europa (2014) The European crisis and its human cost. A call for
fair alternatives and solutions. Crisis Monitoring Report 2014
Carrington, D. (2017) Trump’s order signals end of US dominance in
climate change battle. The Guardian. 28.03.2017. https://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2017/mar/28/trump-climate-change-
executive-order-us-dominance-china. Accessed 31 August 2017
Chapman, B. (2017) Gas companies spend €104m lobbying to ensure
Europe remains ‘locked in’ to fossil fuels for decades, report finds.
The independent. 31.10.2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
business/news/gas-industry-spending-millions-lobbying-to-ensure-
europe-is-locked-in-to-fossil-fuels-for-decades-a8028056.html.
Accessed 22 February 2018
Chappel, S. (2016) UNHCR despairs over Europe’s lack of solidarity in
handling refugee crisis. Euronews. 24.02.2016. http://www.
euronews.com/2016/02/24/unhcr-despairs-over-lack-of-solidarity-
in-europe-in-handling-refugee-crisis. Accessed 13 December 2017
Chomicz, E. (2017) EU budget post-Brexit. Confronting reality, explor-
ing viable solutions. European Policy Centre. Discussion Paper 7
March 2017. ISSN 1782-494X. Sustainable Prosperity for Europe
Programme
Conservatives (2017) Forward, together. Our plan for a stronger Britain
and a prosperous future. The Conservative and Unionist Party
Manifesto 2017
Corporate Europe Observatory (2017) The great gas lock-in. Industry
lobbying behind the EU push for new gas infrastructure. October
2017
Crisp, J. (2016) What President Trump could mean for energy and climate
policy. Euractiv. 08 November 2016. https://www.euractiv.com/
section/climate-environment/interview/what-president-trump-could-
mean-for-energy-and-climate-policy/. Accessed 31 August 2017
Ecofys (2014) Subsidies and costs of EU energy. Final Report. Project
number: DESLN14583. Study ordered by the European
Commission DG-Energy
ESAD (2015) The price of austerity. March 2015. TUC
European Commission (2011) Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Roadmap
for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050. Brussels,
08.03.2011. COM (2011) 112 final
European Commission (2013) Communication from the Commission.
Delivering the internal electricity market and making the most of
public intervention. Brussels, 05.11.2013. COM (2013) 7243 final.
European Commission (2015a). Energy Union Package. Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the
Regions and the European Investment Bank. A Framework Strategy
for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate
Change Policy. COM (2015) 80 final. Brussels, 25.02.2015
European Commission (2015b) European Commission—Fact Sheet.
State of the Energy Union—questions and answers. MEMO-15-
6106_EN. Brussels, 18.11.2015
European Commission (2015c) 2030 framework for climate and energy
policies. Climate Action. http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/
index_en.htm. Accessed 13 July 2017
European Commission (2015d) Financial Report 2015. http://ec.europa.
eu/budget/financialreport/2015/revenue/index_en.html. Accessed
07 July 2017
European Commission (2016a) Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Governance of the Energy
Union, amending Directive 94/22/EC, Directive 98/70/EC, Directive
2009/31/EC, Regulation (EC)No 663/2009, Regulation (EC) No 715/
2009, Directive 2009/73/EC, Council Directive 2009/119/EC,
Directive 2010/31/EU, Directive 2012/27/EU, Directive 2013/30/EU
and Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU)
No 525/2013. Brussels, 30.11.2016. COM (2016) 759 final
European Commission (2016b) Speech by Commissioner Arias Cañete at
the Business Europe Power Market Event. Brussels, 24 October
2016. Speech/16/3526
European Commission (2017a) Annex to the Recommendation for a
Council Decision authorising the opening of the negotiations for an
agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the
European Union. COM (2017) 218 final. Brussels, 3.5.2017
European Commission (2017b) Annex. Updated Roadmap for the
Energy Union to the Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the
European Investment Bank. Second Report on the State of the
EnergyUnion. COM (2017) 53 final. Annex I. Brussels, 01.02.2017
European Commission (2017c) Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European
246 J Environ Stud Sci (2018) 8:239–248
Investment Bank. Second Report on the State of the Energy Union.
COM (2017) 53 final. Brussels, 01.02.2017
European Renewable Energy Council (2013) EU Tracking Roadmap
2013. Keeping Track of Renewable Energy Targets Towards 2020
Evans, R., Bengstsson, H., Carrington, D. andHoward, E. (2015) Shell and
BP alone eclipse renewable energy sector on access to ministers. The
Guardian. 28.04.2015. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2015/apr/28/fossil-fuel-lobby-given-far-more-access-to-uk-ministers-
than-renewables-analysis. Accessed 22 February 2018
Finke B (2007) Civil society participation in EU governance. Living Rev
Euro Gov 2(2). https://doi.org/10.12942/lreg-2007-2
Fitfield, J. (2017) States expected to continue course toward clean energy
future. Pew Trusts. Part Four of the State of the States 2017 series.
26.01.2017. http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
blogs/stateline/2017/01/26/states-expected-to-continue-course-
toward-clean-energy-future. Accessed 22 February 2018
Fletcher, N. (2016) Oil price surges as OPEC and non-OPEC members
agree deal to cut output. The Guardian. 12.12.2016. https://www.
theguardian.com/business/2016/dec/12/oil-price-surges-opec-non-
opec-agree-deal-cut-output. Accessed 01 September 2017
Hanrahan, M. and Wang, J. (2017) Number of fatal terrorist attacks in
western Europe increasing, data sow. Reuters. 12.07.2017. https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks/number-of-fatal-
terrorist-attacks-in-western-europe-increasing-data-show-
idUSKBN19X1QO. Accessed 13 December 2017
Hauser H (2011) European Union Lobbying Post-Lisbon: an economic
analysis. Berkeley J Int Law 29(20):680–709
Heritier, A. (2002) New modes of governance in Europe: policy making
without legislating? IHS Political Science Series: 2002, No. 81.
[Working Paper]
Hope, M. (2016) Fossil Fuel Lobby Celebrates as EU Gives Coal
Subsidies a Lifeline. DeSmog UK. 30.11.2016. https://www.
desmog.uk/2016/11/30/fossil-fuel-lobby-celebrates-eu-gives-coal-
subsidies-lifeline. Accessed 10 July 2017
House of Commons (2017). The future of the natural environment after
the EU Referendum. Environmental Audit Committee. Sixth Report
of Session 2016–17
IEA (2018) Oil market report. 19 January 2018
InfluenceMap (2016) How much big oil spends on obstructive climate
lobbying. April 2016
Jacobsen, H. and Crisp, J. (2014) EU leaders adopt ‘flexible’ energy and
climate targets for 2030. EurActive, 28.10.2014. http://www.
euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/eu-leaders-adopt-flexible-
energy-and-climate-targets-2030-309462. Accessed 14 July 2015
Khan, S. (2017) Brexit could ‘derail’ EU attempts to fight climate change
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, say MEPs. The Independent.
08.02.2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/brexit-
latest-news-derail-eu-attempts-climate-change-greenhouse-gas-
emissions-meps-ets-a7569896.html. Accessed 29 March 2017
Kolher-Koch B, Rittberger B (2006) The ‘governance turn’ in EU studies.
J Common Mark Stud 44(Annual Review):27–49
Lafferty WM, Ruud A (eds) (2008) Promoting sustainable electricity in
Europe: challenging the path dependence of dominant energy sys-
tems. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Landis-Marinello, K. L. (2017) States will continue to lead the charge on
renewable energy. American Bar Association. Vol 48, No. 4.March/
April 2017. https://www.americanbar.org/publications/trends/2016-
2017/march-april-2017/states-will-continue-to-lead-the-charge-on-
renewable-energy.html. Accessed 22 February 2018
Livingston, D. and Brattberg, E. (2017) Beyond fatalism: transatlantic
energy and climate cooperation after the Paris announcement.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 05.07.2017. http://
carnegieendowment.org/2017/07/05/beyond-fatalism-transatlantic-
energy-and-climate-cooperation-after-paris-announcement-pub-
71443. Accessed 31 August 2017
Lubbers M, Scheepers P (2010) Divergent trends of Euroscepticism in
countries and regions of the European Union. Eur J Polit Res 49:
787–817
Lycetts (2017) Renewable energy in the EU: better off Brexit? Energy
Digital, 3rd February 2017. http://www.energydigital.com/
renewable-energy/renewable-energy-eu-better-brexit. Accessed 16
May 2017
Lyman, R. and Berendt, J. (2016) Poland steps back from stricter anti-
abortion law. The New York Times. 02.10.2016. https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/10/07/world/europe/poland-abortion-law-
protests.html?mcubz=0. Accessed 31 August 2017
Martewicz, M. (2017) Poland faces harsh EU reality in push for coal
exemptions. Bloomberg. 16.05.2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-05-16/poland-faces-harsh-eu-reality-in-its-push-
for-coal-exemptions. Accessed 10 July 2017
Mir-Artigues P, Del Rio P (2016) The economics and policy of solar
photovoltaic generation. Springer, Switzerland
Nichols,W. (2014) EU 2030 climate and energy package—the green econ-
omy reaction. BusinessGreen 24.10.2014. http://www.businessgreen.
com/bg/analysis/2377608/eu-2030-climate-and-energy-package-the-
green-economy-reaction. Accessed 14 July 2015
Nielsen, N. (2014) Alarm over EU proposal to cut loose renewable ener-
gy firms. EU Observer 09.04.2014. https://euobserver.com/
environment/123807. Accessed 10 July 2017
Official Journal of the European Union (2006) Council Regulation (EC)
No 1084/2006 of 11 July 2006 establishing a Cohesion Fund and
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1164/94. L210 31.7.2006
Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) (2009) Council Directive
2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on
Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or
petroleum products. 09.10.2009 (L265)
OPEC (2016) Joint Conclusion of the EU-OPEC Energy Dialogue 12th
High-Level Meeting. Vienna, Austria 21.03.2016. http://www.opec.
org/opec_web/en/press_room/3450.htm. Accessed 01 September 2017
Oxfam (2013) A cautionary tale. The true cost of austerity and inequality
in Europe. 174 Oxfam Briefing Paper. September 2013
Prince, R. (2017) Barclays report: Oil demand will plummet by 2025 due
to electric cars. Hybridcars. 06.10.2017. http://www.hybridcars.
com/barclays-report-oil-demand-will-plummet-by-2025-due-to-
electric-cars/. Accessed 23.02.2018
Rayner, T. (2016) Brexit would put the EU’s efforts to reduce carbon
emissions at risk. LSE. 20.04.2016. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
2016/04/20/cut-out-brexit-would-put-the-eus-efforts-to-cut-carbon-
emissions-at-risk/. Accessed 29 March 2017
Razzouk, N.; Rascouet, A. and Motevalli, G. (2016) OPEC confounds




Reed, S. (2017) OPEC, fighting market forces, extends production cuts.
The New York Times. 25.05.2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
05/25/business/energy-environment/oil-opec-shale-renewables.
html?mcubz=0. Accessed 01 September 2017
Selin, H. (2017) Trump’s exit of Paris climate accord strengthens China
and Europe. The Conversation. 05.06.2017. https://theconversation.
com/trumps-exit-of-paris-climate-accord-strengthens-china-and-
europe-78653. Accessed 31 August 2017
Sherer, S. (2017) Italy chides EU partners for lack of solidarity in migrant
crisis. Reuters. 21.06.2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
refugee-day-italy-migrants/italy-chides-eu-partners-for-lack-of-
J Environ Stud Sci (2018) 8:239–248 247
solidarity-in-migrant-crisis-idUSKBN19B281. Accessed 13
December 2017
Simms, A. (2017) The curious disappearance of climate change, from




Smith, D.; Enders, C. and Rushe, D. (2017) EU leads attacks on Trump’s
rollback of Obama climate policy. The Guardian. 28.03.2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/mar/28/climate-
change-eu-leader-trump-executive-order. Accessed 31 August 2017
Timperley, J. (2017a) French election 2017: Where the candidates stand
on energy and climate change. Carbon Brief. 07.03.2017. https://
www.carbonbrief.org/french-election-2017-where-candidates-
stand-energy-climate-change. Accessed 23 February 2018
Timperley, J. (2017b) German election 2017: where the parties stand on
energy and climate change. Carbon Brief. 21.09.2017. https://www.
carbonbrief.org/german-election-2017-where-parties-stand-on-
energy-climate-change. Accessed 23 February 2018
Verseck, K. (2013) Hungary steps away from European democracy.
Spiegel. 11.03.2013. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/
hungary-constitutional-reforms-signal-drift-away-from-democracy-
a-888064.html. Accessed 31 August 2017
Wearden, G. and Fletcher, N. (2017) OPEC extends oil production cuts.
The Guardian. 30.11.2017. https://www.theguardian.com/business/
live/2017/nov/30/opec-meeting-oil-cuts-bitcoin-volatile-sterling-
brexit-business-live. Accessed 14 December 2017
248 J Environ Stud Sci (2018) 8:239–248
